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Introduction 
Just before midday on 24 March 1999, six 
cruise missile-armed B-52s lifted off very 
publicly from Fairford in Gloucestershire. The 
first of 27 cruise missiles was not launched until 
late afternoon, allowing President Milosevic one 
last chance to cease his offensive against 
Kosovan Albanians. He did not take it, and 
during the subsequent 78-day Operation Allied 
Force, 38,004 NATO sorties were flown. Apart 
from covert action by a limited number of 
Special Forces, no NATO ground troops took 
part in any combat action. Allied Force was to 
rely on air power. 
One year later and what major lessons should 
Europe learn from the air campaign? The first is 
not to oversell air power. When NATO went into 
battle on 24 March, the objective was 'to 
prevent more repression and violence against the 
civilian population of Kosovo. ' Fewer than 
3,000 people had died in Kosovo before the 
bombing began. Thereafter, ethnic cleansing 
escalated to the extent that an estimated 10,000 
were killed and 750,000 Kosovar Albanians 
deported. 
Post-conflict analysis confirmed about 60% 
of the target-hit claims made during Allied 
Force. Furthermore, air strikes seriously af-
fected the lifelines that lubricated and sustained 
the Serbian war machine. Serbian forces proved 
adept, however, at hiding their MiG-21 s, their 
vehicles, their armour, their artillery and their 
logistics under runways, next to civilian build-
ings, churches, mosques, in caves and woods. 
It was not until Allied Force was synchronised 
with effective Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
ground action and international political resolve 
that it broke President Milosevic's will to con-
tinue the struggle, and made him sue for peace 
on NATO's terms. 
Air power can have a major impact against a 
modem industrial state in the right circum-
stances. However, although the air campaign 
ended with Milosevic surrendering Serb military 
occupancy of Kosovo, Supreme Allied Com-
mander General Wesley Clark admitted that, 
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'you cannot stop paramilitary murder with 
airplanes.' Politicians should never prefer the 
speed and simplicity of air attack to the more 
time-consuming and painstaking investigation of 
grievances and disputes. Bombing is often easier 
than tackling powerful interest groups at home 
and abroad. 
Political realities 
The great American airman Curtis LeMay 
advised back in 1972 that 
Once you make a decision to use military force 
to solve your problem, then you ought to use 
overwhelmingforce. You save resources, you 
save lives - your own and your enemy s -the 
recovery is qUicker and everybody s back to 
peacefol existence in a shorter period of time. 
NATO leaders did nothing like that last March. 
Whereas 2,614 Coalition aircraft were in place 
on the eve of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, 
less than 350 were available to air commander, 
Lieutenant General Mike Short, on 24 March 
1999 despite the fact that Milosevic's plans for 
ethnic cleansing had been known for six 
months. 
Given that air power appeared to have driven 
Milosevic to accept the Dayton agreement over 
Bosnia, NATO leaders saw a 'drive-by' shooting 
of a few cruise missiles over 2-3 days as suffi-
cient to bring him to accept the Rambouillet 
peace plan for Kosovo. It was indicative of the 
'short-termist' approach that there were just 51 
approved targets on 24 March. By Day 3 this 
had risen to 91, but even then Mike Short had to 
cancel his second F-117 wave because they 
were out of targets. The fact that NATO bomb-
ers kept using the Ministry of Interior Police 
Headquarters at Pristina to jettison unused 
ordnance should not mask the fact that Allied 
strike aircraft often rearranged the rubble in the 
same shattered government buildings for lack of 
any alternative. 
Strikes against strategic fuel supplies and 
bridges did not start until two weeks into the 
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can: ,c CJgn, while Serbian power stations were 
not visited until 3 May. Towards the end ofthe 
I I-week campaign, the Alliance was flying 300-
strike missions/day as against a paltry 30 on 
some nights in March. Fourteen nations eventu-
ally contributed 1,090 aircraft to Allied Force, 
by which time the quick slap on the wrist had 
escalated to the point where Allied air had closed 
down all Yugoslavia's oil refining capacity, 14 
power stations, struck 63 bridges including 
seven across the Danube, half its military 
reserves and one quarter of its industrial stocks. 
It would have been better if President Clinton 
had been more opaque about the possible use of 
ground troops on Day I because from then on, 
Milosevic believed that he had only to face 
down rather limited air power and watch 
NATO's political cohesion unravel. But does 
anyone seriously believe that 19 NATO govern-
ments would have authorised the use of force in 
March if they had been asked to authorise the 
first major bombing campaign in Europe since 
Dresden? The incremental nature of the Allied 
Force air campaign will be the template for 
future coalition operations. 
Precision Bombing 
Back in 1944, it took 9,070 2,0001b 'dumb' 
bombs dropped from 3,024 aircraft to guarantee 
the destruction of a specific house. That house 
can now be destroyed by a single F-117 carry-
ing two laser-guided I-ton bombs. Twenty-three 
stealthy F-117s were deployed against Yugoslav 
targets, while the USAF's most advanced 
bomber, the bat-winged B-2 Spirit, bestrode the 
globe from Missouri to drop eight tons of GPS-
guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) at 
a time, each with a 10m terminal accuracy. 
During the 78-day air campaign, NATO 
aircraft delivered 23,614 munitions against 421 
static targets, and over 520 tactical targets in 
Kosovo, with 99.6% accuracy. Only 30 of these 
caused collateral damage, but their political 
impact was nonetheless massive. One air-
launched missile took it into its head to go for 
the capital of neighbouring Bulgaria, while 
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mistaken targeting information led to a B-2 
bomber dropping a 2,0001b JDAM on the Chi-
nese Embassy in Belgrade. . 
34% of weapons dropped during Allied 
Force - and that 34% refers to actual weapons 
rather than sorties - were precision guided. 
Most precision-guided weapons at the start of 
Allied Force required eye contact with the 
ground to zero-in on targets using lasers, 
television or infra-red. It was calculated that 
41 % of possible flying time was lost due to 
weather, and in the prevailing conditions of low 
cloud cover and thick mist, many aircraft were 
either unable to fire their weapons because their 
targets were obscured, or the 'lock' got broken 
as the weapon went down, causing it to 'go 
rogue' and veer away. 
In response, Raytheon produced an all-
weather modification for Paveway within 46 
days. Boeing has raised its JDAM output from 
130/month at the height of Allied Force to 700/ 
month today, and the US has indicated that it 
intends to buy 87,496 JDAM kits by 2015. In 
contrast, the RAF is still seeking approval for its 
'interim' solution - the same Raytheon GPS-
based conversion for its Paveway IT LGBs -
even though it costs just $19,000 to convert a 
standard 'dumb' bomb into a JDAM. 
Kosovo taught that there are a large variety 
of targets out there which demand very differ-
ent approaches in terms of launch ranges, 
warheads or aiming technology if they are to be 
'taken out' in optimum fashion. Credible air 
forces will need a mix of precision delivery 
systems, for which the French confirmed the 
validity of two-crew operations, especially at 
night. 
Cruise missiles also allowed the Alliance to 
maintain its tempo of operations when the 
weather conspired against manned target identi" 
fication. It is not surprising that the US is 
investing in more and better cruise missiles, 
together with discriminatory warheads and those 
that can be reprogrammed in flight. 
NATO was operating around 260 offensive 
aircraft by the end of the campaign. Numbers 
are debatable because swing-role aircraft muddy 
IFS Into 2/00 
the waters, but there is no denying that credible 
offensive aircraft were in relatively short supply. 
Furthermore, of 8,160 precision weapons 
dropped in all (excluding SEAD), France ac-
counted for 7% (582) Canada 4% (360), Neth-
erlands 3% (280), UK 3% (242), and Spain a 
little under 2% (149). 
Of 14 air forces involved in Allied Force, 
fewer than half started the conflict equipped for 
precision delivery. In all, around 80 aircraft 
allocated to Allied Force were almost entirely 
confined to air defence patrols. Too many 
NATO air forces contributed to the air campaign 
while avoiding any media flak when bombs went 
astray. 
Two conclusions spring to mind when 
evaluating the precision strike experience. First, 
comparison of US and European post-Kosovo 
air weapons shopping lists shows that even 
modernising European air forces risk staying a 
generation behind. Second, the Yugoslav experi-
ence should make those investing in new air 
defence fighters at the expense of new ground 
attack systems re-think their procurement 
strategy. At a time when NATO is very short of 
modem, all weather strike aircraft, and the 
average NATO aircraft over Kosovo was 26-
years old, can the UK's top priority still be 232 
single-seat air defence-optimised Eurofighters? 
Minimising Friendly and Enemy 
Casualties 
The US lost 18,369 aircraft from 1,746,568 
combat sorties in World War 2, and 1,606 from 
1,992,000 in Vietnam. Against Yugoslavia, 
arguably the first war waged solely for humani-
tarian and civil ideals, not one American life was 
lost in combat (though two died in a helicopter 
accident). 
Not many Europeans have taken on board 
how high a price the US is now willing to pay to 
avoid the loss of military life. What this means 
for the future of huge armies I leave to others. 
But in air power terms, the pressure will be on 
to ensure that all aircrew will come back the 
next time. 
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80% of the Allied air effort on 24 March 
went against the Serbian air defence network, 
but although by June NATO had shot down 6 
Yugoslav aircraft, destroyed another 100 on the 
ground and significantly damaged 10 airfields, 
the Serbian low level air defence system re-
mained disturbingly intact. 
Constant defence suppression effort forced 
the Yugoslav SAM defences to hide or operate 
without radar guidance, which severely limited 
their effectiveness. But over 700 Serb SAM 
launches were observed during Allied Force, 
which was more than three times as severe as 
the number faced during Desert Storm. 
Much was made of Yugoslav success in 
shooting down an F-I17. In simple terms, 
Yugoslav use of the old Soviet Spoonrest early 
warning radar operating down to 80 MHzs, 
combined with US employment of the same 
flight path several days running and too widely 
spread Prowler jamming support, left the F-1l7 
badly exposed. But it is an old EW truism that 
you only have a capability if you can repeat it. 
As the Yugoslavs never repeated the trick, they 
did not have a capability. 
But they did exploit NATO's weaknesses. 
Back in April 1994 a RN Sea Harrier pilot was 
shot down over Gorazde because his Radar 
Warning System was incapable of detecting the 
approach of a passively guided SA-16. In March 
1999, most NATO aircraft still lacked Missile 
Approach Warners. Given the hundreds of man-
portable Yugoslav SA-7, SA-16 and SA-18s that 
remained in Kosovo to the end, the only practi-
cable answer was to stay above 15,000ft. 
Although much Yugoslav air defence kit was 
long in the tooth, the Serbs proved that low 
cunning can often thwart high fliers. For exam-
ple, they used early warning radar - which 
Allied aircraft were banned from striking to 
avoid affecting civil air traffic - to predict when 
an Allied package would be three minutes out. 
When that three minutes were up, they would 
fire SAMs blind. Another ploy was to position 
two fire control radars, one to the left and one 
to the right of predicted Allied track. One would 
be turned on, SEAD would concentrate on it, 
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and then the silent control radar would fire up 
on the other beam. One French pilot saw three 
missiles on one occasion, which meant that the 
Serbs got close. 
Kosovo reinforced the importance of elec-
tronic warfare. Although the US provided 40 
EA-6B Prowlers out ofa worldwide total of95, 
its resources were stretched - during one 24-
hour period - every available Prowler was 
deployed. By mid-200 I, the USN and USMC 
hope to have 123 Prowlers, with 104 available at 
anyone time, which is just as well because 
NATO could be up against a more modern SAM 
inventory than the Yugoslav the next time 
around. 
Europe depended in the US for EW expertise 
and for most suppression of Serb air defences. 
European air forces need to acquire a credible 
number of jamming aircraft, and procure far 
more HARM/ALARM shooters, if they are not to 
be seen as hangers-on. 
The Americans were justifiably proud of 
rescuing their downed F-1I7 and F-16 aircrew, 
and the US could do this because it had an 
excellent Combat Search and Rescue capability. 
Never forget that 500 missions were flown in 5 
days to bring out US pilot, Captain Scott 
0' Grady, after his F -16 was brought down over 
Bosnia in 1995. That was roughly one-third of 
the British sorties flown during the entire 
Kosovo conflict. How long will Europe continue 
to rely on the Americans to pluck its downed 
aircrew out of the fire? 
Then there is guaranteed availability of the 
main bases themselves. Italian airfields were so 
chock-a-block with Alliance aircraft that when 
the RAF brought its Bruggen Tornados forward, 
they had to be based in Corsica. Aviano near 
Venice played host to no fewer than 173 aircraft 
- what a target for even a relatively unsophisti-
cated Scud-type ballistic missile! Given that 25 
countries now have ballistic missiles, Europe 
should be thinking far more seriously about 
theatre missile defence. There is also a need for 
a long-term strategy for maintaining contin-
gency airfields. Too many hardened aircraft 
shelters at former Cold War airfields now sit all 
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forlorn around where quality runways used to 
be before they were ripped up for motorway 
infill. 
Unmaned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
UAVs were another Allied Force success story, 
with the US and European UAVs conducting 
important reconnaissance operations and battle 
damage assessments, and the Predator becom-
ing the first US UAV to designate a target for an 
A-IO-Iaunched laser-guided bomb. NATO lost 
around 20 UAVs during Allied Force, but that 
put 20-plus fewer lives at risk. Defence sup-
pression and target designation UAVs, flying at 
the outskirts of a manned strike passage, offer 
an appealing way forward. 
The destruction of a rail bridge just as a 
passenger train was about to cross it, and the 
inability to differentiate between a convoy of 
refugee tractors and army lorries, were two 
examples of the lack of real-time intelligence in 
the beginning. According to a RAF study, 
location data and images of Serb mobile targets 
took up to 72 hours to reach squadrons, making 
attacks impossible before they moved. 
UAVs certainly made a difference - on 12 
June, staff in the CAOC (Combined Air Opera-
tions Centre) at Vicenza could see Serb MiG-
21 s, hitherto hidden under the runway, taking 
off from Pristina airfield before the Russians 
arrived. Henceforward, UAVs plus real-time data 
links will be able to tell a CAOC that an objec-
tive has been damaged, allowing targets to be 
changed in mid-air. That said, UAVs were found 
to be slow and vulnerable to ground fire. They 
could not be used in winter over Kosovo be-
cause their wings ice up. UAVs are best used in 
clear, night conditions, when they are ideal to 
feeding pictures via data link to the CAOC' or an 
attack aircraft up at 20,000ft. 
Joined-up air power 
For all the hype about stalking the globe like an 
invisible caped crusader, each B-2 strike re-
quired a minimum of 14 CAP/Escort, ECM and 
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SEAD support aircraft and 85 aircrew. And that 
didn't include the tankers, RC-135 Rivet Joint 
and AWACs that were also vital to the success 
of the operation. 
Such figures explain why by 10 June, al-
though NATO had flown 10,484 dedicated strike 
missions, a further 27,520 had to flown by 
'enablers' - air defenders, defence suppressers, 
in-flight refuellers, command and control assets, 
and surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. 
And while Europeans conducted 47% of the 
strike sorties, they flew only 29% of support 
ones. Every European strike mission required an 
average of 3 US support aircraft to suppress 
enemy air defences, refuel and direct the battle. 
Where France contributed ten tankers, the RAF 
nine and Germany none, the US committed 
around 150. 
The US provided 60% of the air power at the 
start of Allied Force, which grew to nearly 80% 
by the end. The US also met approximately 95% 
of NATO's intelligence requirements in Allied 
Force. Interoperability between this lot and the 
rest of NATO is essential, though the French 
decision to make the Mirage 20000 capable of 
dropping any US bomb shows that much has 
already been done to date. But while US AWACs 
aircraft, command and control platforms and Air 
Force aircraft over Kosovo had secure radios; 
many of the rest did not. At a time when the 
Serbs were making good use of mobile phones 
and COMINT to maximise the threat to NATO 
aircrew lives, Alliance partners appeared to lack 
the will even to put secure radios into their 
aircraft. 
The simplest improvements are often the 
most difficult. Much was expected of US Army 
Apache gunships, which never saw action in the 
air campaign. Glaring shortcomings were 
subsequently found in aircrew proficiency, the 
Apaches' long-range communications equip-
ment, electronic countermeasures and fuel 
system. All the years of underfunding on train-
ing and equipment had come home to roost. 
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Cost 
While Air Power can be cost free in friendly 
casualties, it is anything but in financial terms. 
The US plans to increase defence spending 
by $112 billion over the next 5 years, including 
an increased $.92 billion post-Kosovo, mainly 
for JDAM, Sensor Fuzed Weapons and Wind 
Corrected Munitions Dispensers. On the other 
hand, France and the UK anticipate no signifi-
cant increases and Germany plans to reduce 
expenditure by at least $10 billion over the same 
period. For my money, the'UK should sacrifice a 
few Air Defence Eurofighters to cut down on 
overstretch, and to pay for a bucketful of JDAM 
and Tactical Tomahawk ($600,000 each) be-
cause these will be the weapons of choice in 
any upcoming conflict. 
If air power is to be the clinical and risk-free 
alternative to ground operations, then many 
procurement cows will need to be sacrificed to 
pay for the UAVs, heavy lift, C4I et al to make it 
all work. None of this will come cheap. Much 
more than tinkering with the British Strategic 
Defence Review will have to be done if the 
wonderful declarations on European Defence 
and Security Identity are not to ring hollow. 
Coping with uncertainty 
It is an old adage that you should train in peace, 
as you would go to war. Over the past few 
years, NATO had built up a deployable compu-
terised CAOC at Ramstein to be THE organisa-
tion that would spring into action to control an 
air operation such as Allied Force. Come 24 
March and all the hitherto hard-won expertise 
went out of the window. As the Americans were 
leading the show, they flew in a whole new 
bunch of folk from the US to start from' 
scratch. General Short admitted, 'NATO did not 
fight the way it trained. The [US joint task 
force 1 took over everything and left other 
nations watching from the sidelines.' This was a 
major source of friction throughout the air 
campaign. 
In the beginning, all operations north of 44 
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degrees North were allocated to high value US 
assets such as the B-2. Far from being on the 
NATO Air Tasking Order - the White ATO-
operations against Belgrade or Novi Sad were 
for US eyes-only - the Black ATO. The Black 
ATO kept secrets secret from the Serbs listening 
into insecure radios, but it is a fact of air power 
life that Europe will have to stay ready to 
respond to the US tune for as long as it acts the 
dependent relation. 
NATO will also have to stay flexible enough 
to cope with imperatives that make more politi-
cal sense than military. In General Mike Short's 
candid opinion, 'the impact of bombing on 
ethnic cleansing was zero'. NATO strike aircraft 
were only sent against individual tanks in 
Kosovo for the same reason that General 
Schwarzkopf had to divert fully one-third of his 
Desert Storm strategic air missions to futile 
Scud-hunting over the Iraqi desert back in 1991 
- because of the political imperative was to be 
seen 'to be doing something'. That sort of 
diversion of effort is not going to go away. 
In both Desert Storm and Allied Force, 
European strike forces went into action intend-
ing to fly low-level. They were often well placed 
for this - the IS French Mirage 2000Ds in-
volved over Kosovo were designed to deliver 
weapons accurately in all weather at 600kts and 
down at 70m. But for a package to operate at 
low-level, all aircraft have to be low-level 
capable. US F-IS crews, who were not trained 
in low-level IMC operations, were just one 
reason why the Mirages and Tornados were 
forced up. 
Whatever the peacetime game plan, it is 
unlikely to survive beyond the first few days of 
the next allied air operation. Therefore, air 
forces must be able to cope and adapt flexibly to 
whatever is asked of them, which relies on the 
right training and ethos. It cannot be right to 
cancel air exercises and training to pay for the 
Kosovo overspend. 
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Conclusion 
The sight of US F-ISCs, F-16CJ and European 
Tornado ECR defending and clearing the way 
for a strike package of US F -I Ss, French 
Mirage 2000Ds and Canadian F-18s was very 
heartening for those who see NATO cohesion as 
the major international achievement of the past 
SO years. But with its 'stealth' bombers, satel-
lite-guided munitions and unmanned surveillance 
assets, the USAF not only used air power to hit 
more targets more precisely and with fewer 
aircraft than ever before liut it was also way 
ahead over Kosovo. And that lead could disap-
pear further and further into the distance unless 
'smart' European interoperability and procure-
ment starts to make itself felt very soon. My 
fear is that, henceforward, there will be a 
growing gulf between NATO air forces that 
invest in precise strike, intelligence and commu-
nications, and those that are makeweights. 
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